WTN Claim Register What people say about We The North, checked one claim at a time
Register › About money

We The North addresses

Three published addresses for the same platform. Copy rather than retype, and verify the signature once you are through.

Address 1 hn2paw7zadwkcra3qzv5e4q547i7e5lvxm62cfxqftuqdu7moiu2ceyd.onion
Address 2 hn2paw7zfvndw3dovycegeqmvvnf4pl67b3g2p7pohjlzavloosh73id.onion
Address 3 hn2paw7zrgujyhnt6mgxlt2q6uhgbke4itpqitxhyfbumq3wtnckbuyd.onion

This site publishes the list and does not monitor it. An address that opens is not an address that is genuine, and the check that settles it takes under a minute.

Monero is untraceable

The claimMonero is untraceable, so payments cannot be linked to me
Partly true The chain hop is protected. Almost nobody loses privacy on the chain.

What is genuinely true

Ring signatures hide which input was actually spent among decoys. Stealth addresses mean each payment lands at a fresh one time destination, so two payments cannot be linked by where they went. Confidential transactions hide the amount. A passive observer of the chain learns that a transaction happened and essentially nothing else.

That is a real and substantial difference from Bitcoin, whose transaction graph is public, permanent, and indexed by every analytics firm, with clustering that improves every year against data that never expires. A Bitcoin payment made today can be examined by better tools in five years. This is why funding decisions are not decisions about current tooling.

Where privacy is actually lost

The real exposureAt the boundary, where money converts from something with a record into something without one. A withdrawal from an exchange that knows who you are, followed a few minutes later by a deposit of a matching amount, does most of the work for anybody looking later.

The cryptography is not the weak point and has not been for years. The weak points are ordinary and boring.

LeakWhy it defeats the chain protection
Timing correlationA withdrawal and a deposit minutes apart with matching amounts is a pattern, and the chain never had to be read to see it.
The exchange recordSomebody knows you bought, when, and how much. That record exists whatever happens afterwards.
The bank transfer behind itOne step further back and entirely conventional.
Custodial walletsA wallet somebody else controls reintroduces exactly the record you were avoiding.
Reusing a deposit addressDefeats the one time destination property, which is most of the point.

Why the claim is stated too strongly

Because the cryptography is genuinely impressive and easy to describe, while the boundary problem is dull and involves no interesting mathematics. People repeat the part that is satisfying to explain.

The result is a specific failure: somebody who understands ring signatures well, has excellent on chain privacy, and an obvious trail on either side of it. Understanding the strong part is not protective if the weak part is where the exposure lives.

The honest version

Monero protects the transaction. It does nothing about how the money got to you or where it goes afterwards, and it cannot, because those are outside the chain entirely. Treat the coin choice as necessary and not sufficient, which is a much less satisfying sentence than the claim and considerably more useful.