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We The North addresses

Three published addresses for the same platform. Copy rather than retype, and verify the signature once you are through.

Address 1 hn2paw7zadwkcra3qzv5e4q547i7e5lvxm62cfxqftuqdu7moiu2ceyd.onion
Address 2 hn2paw7zfvndw3dovycegeqmvvnf4pl67b3g2p7pohjlzavloosh73id.onion
Address 3 hn2paw7zrgujyhnt6mgxlt2q6uhgbke4itpqitxhyfbumq3wtnckbuyd.onion

This site publishes the list and does not monitor it. An address that opens is not an address that is genuine, and the check that settles it takes under a minute.

PGP is not needed any more

The claimPGP is old and not really needed any more
Not true It is the only thing that answers the one question worth answering.

Where the belief comes from

Interfaces improved. Platforms encrypt messages themselves, addresses get displayed in tidy panels, and the manual steps that used to be unavoidable are now optional in most flows. It genuinely feels like the awkward part was solved.

What improved is convenience inside a session. The question a signature answers sits before the session starts, and nothing about a nicer interface touches it. A convincing clone has the same tidy panels, because it copied them.

What a signature establishes

Exactly two things, and they are narrow and absolute. That whoever produced it held a specific private key, and that the signed text is unchanged by a single character. There is no partial credit and nothing probabilistic. Chained to a fingerprint you established independently, that answers whether you are where you think you are.

No other tool available to you answers that question at all. Not the address looking right, not the page loading, not the interface matching your memory, not the source you got it from. That is why the claim fails: something cannot be obsolete when nothing has replaced its function.

The four outcomes worth knowing

ResultMeaning
BAD signatureText altered or signature fabricated. Unambiguous, and the response is to leave.
No public keySigned by a key you do not hold. A gap in your keyring, not a verdict on the message.
GOOD, unexpected keyThe maths works against a key that is not yours. Dangerous, because the word GOOD appears.
GOOD, old dateVerifies, but the statement is months old. Signatures never expire, so genuine old ones get replayed.
Two secondsThe last two catch experienced people, and one habit defeats both: read which key signed and when, rather than pattern matching on the word GOOD.

The real objection

That it is inconvenient. That is fair and it is a different claim from being unnecessary. The honest answer is that the inconvenient part happens once, when you establish a fingerprint carefully from several independent sources, and every check afterwards is mechanical and takes under a minute. That ratio is the whole argument, and the reason people skip it is that the setup produces no visible result at the time you do it. See verifying.